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1. Introduction 
Prisoner  dilemmas  (PDs)  have  been  employed  across  the  social  and  business 
sciences, philosophy, and biology as prime examples of the tension between individual 
and collective rationality.
1  They constitute powerful illustrations of the gains foregone 
when strategic structure precludes cooperation as an equilibrium strategy.    
The payoffs in PD’s have two forms.   First, they  may be cardinal observable 
payoffs (e.g., years in prison, nuclear warheads, or advertising budgets).  We refer to such 
games  as  Primitive  Prisoner’s  Dilemmas  (PPDs).    Alternatively,  payoffs  may  be 
specified as final utility, which is inherently unobservable.  We refer to these games as 
Utility Prisoner’s Dilemmas (UPDs).  In either case there is an implicit mapping between 
observable  payoff  and  final  utility  that  has  received  scant  attention  in  the  literature.  
Though this neglect may be innocuous for some mappings we show that when a player 
has amicable or adversarial inclination towards the other player there are broad classes of 
utility functions for which it is impossible for a PPD to map into a UPD.  We identify 
classes  of  utility  functions  under  which  games  that  are  not  prisoners  dilemmas  in 
observable payoffs are, in fact, prisoner’s dilemmas in the unobserved utility game.   
  Why our focus on amicable and adversarial preferences?  First, there exists a large 
body of experimental evidence (see Fehr and Gachter 2000 for a survey) that casts doubt 
on  the  indifference  of  players  with  regard  to  the  payoffs  of  other  players.    We  will 
demonstrate that only in the case of truly indifferent players will a game that is a PD in 
                                                 
1 A nice survey of economic applications of the PD can be found in Rapoport (1987). In 
political science, Brams’ (1994) “Theory of Moves” provides a novel analysis of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and argues that mutual cooperation will typically emerge.  
   2
observable payoffs necessarily be a PD in the unobserved utility game.  In fact, the body 
of  experimental  evidence  cited  above  indicates  unambiguously  that  pure  neutrality 
towards the welfare of the other players is the exception, rather the rule. Beyond the 
experimental literature, the potential for altruism in strategic environments has long been 
recognized. For example, strategic frameworks are frequently employed to model intra-
household interactions (see Browning and Chiaporri 1998).  Moreover, intra-household 
and kin altruism is implied by evolutionary biology.    
Adversarial  relationships,  in  the  sense  of  competition,  arise  in  virtually  all 
economic environments.  However in the typical strategic setting adversarial incentives 
are  inherent  in  the  payoff-structure  rather  than  embodied  in  preferences.    Thus,  the 
incentive to adopt a particular strategy is typically governed by own payoff maximization 
rather than explicit consideration of rivals’ payoff.
2  In contrast, we consider strategic 
behavior when a player’s utility is decreasing in the other player’s cardinal payoff.  Such 
preferences  may  correspond  to  conventional  notions  envy  or  malice.    These  terms, 
“envy” and “malice,” have precise economic meanings (see Hammond 1987 and Brennan 
1973), and though this literature addresses issues tangentially related to this paper, it 
never addresses the implications of such utility mappings on the existence of the PD.    
  For those who remain skeptical of amicability or enmity in preferences per-se, there 
exists an alternative motivation that is also entirely consistent with the model and results.  
Namely, if the observable payoff of one player yields an externality (in utils) to others, 
the analysis is identical.  Formally, these externalities would create a wedge between the 
                                                 
2 In zero sum games these objectives would be equivalent. But as noted, our analysis does not concern 
zero-sum games.    3
observable payoff game and the unobservable “welfare” game that is formally equivalent 
to either amicable or adversarial preferences.
3  Such an interpretation opens a plethora of 
applications in economics as well as political science.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 introduces notation 
and definitions necessary to analyze PDs with neutral, amicable, and adversarial players. 
Section 3 presents our most general existence results and specific congruence results for 
amicable, adversarial, indifferent, and asymmetric players.  A Cobb-Douglas example is 
also provided in Section 3.  Section 4 summarizes and concludes.  
 
2. Notation and Definitions 
The Game 
  Consider  a  two-player  game  and  call  the  players  A  and  B  and  their  cardinal 
(observable) payoffs a and b respectively.  Each player has two strategies. Denote the 
players’ strategy sets and strategy choice as respectively: S
p = {1, 2} and s
p for p = A, B.   
So  the  joint  strategy  space  has  four  elements  and  denote  the  associated  observable 
primitive (cardinal) payoff vectors as pij = [aij, bij] where i = s
A
 and j = s
B with the 
payoff space denoted as P Ì R
2.    Let r
p(s) denote the best response  of player p to 
strategy s by the other player.  Without loss of generality, payoffs are non-negative and 
when the clarity constraint permits we suppress the subscripts on a and b.  The one-stage 
                                                 
3 Yet another motivation is a game where joint strategies map into two-good payoffs with one of the 
primitive payoffs is a “good” and other is a “bad” for one player, while the second player has reverse 
preferences  towards  the  payoffs.    For  example,  we  can  imagine  roommates  who  have  contradictory 
preferences towards classical and rock music.  For one roommate classical is a good and rock is a bad, 
while the reverse holds for the other roommate.  Joint strategies yield quantities of both goods, and it is 
easy to construct a PD (i.e., Pareto Inferior equilibrium) in this environment.   
   4
game defined by the above triplet G = [P, S, P] will be called the primitive game. All its 
elements are observable and fully known by both players. 
  A  primitive  prisoner’s  dilemma  (PPD)  occurs  when  the  Nash  Equilibrium  of  the 
primitive game yields a payoff (p) that is vector dominated by some non-equilibrium 
payoff.
4 Without loss of generality let s
p = 1 for (p = A, B) be the strategies that map to 
the vector dominated primitive payoff and s
p = 2 for (p = A, B) the strategies that map to 
the vector dominant payoff.  Using the notation introduced above the payoff vectors are: 
p22 > p11, where a vector inequality indicates vector dominance.   
  Each player has unobservable preferences over the primitive payoff space that are 
complete, transitive, and reflexive.  In a slight (but innocuous) abuse of notation that 
yields considerable notational economy we denote the unobservable utility functions as: 
A(a, b), B(a, b).   Let  Uij= [A(pij), B(pij)] be the vector of final utility payoffs when 
player A plays strategy i and B plays strategy j (where i may equal j ). The functions 
A(pij) and  B(pij) may map non-monotonically from own-primitive-payoff (a for A, b for 
B) to final own-utility due to either amicable or adversarial preferences.  For a given U 
every  Primitive  Game  maps  to  an  associated  Utility  Game  (UG)  and  we  define  the 
associated UG as V(G) = [P, S, U(P)].  If U does not order payoffs as in the observable 
primitive game, V will be a weakly better predictor of players’ strategic behavior than G.  
For expositional convenience we will assume henceforth that the utility functions are 
                                                 
4  For ease of exposition we consider Prisoners Dilemmas where the equilibrium is strictly inferior for both 
players.  Naturally, the definition Pareto inferior would allow only one player to be worse off, while all 
other players might be indifferent.  Focusing on strict PDs considerably streamlines the paper.  However, it 
is critical to note that versions of all propositions and results can be obtained with the weaker PD definition 
– though at a considerable cost in tedium.      5
differentiable.  Extension  to  well-behaved  non-differentiable  utility  functions  is 
straightforward for virtually the entire analysis. 
  A number of indifference curves will have special significance in our analysis and we 
employ the following notation:  Aij = { p Î P: p ~ pij) for player A, while analogously Bij 
denotes player B’s indifference set with pij where i, j = 1, 2.  So A11 is the set of all joint 
payoffs that A finds indifferent to p11.  We use strong versions of the upper and lower 
contour  sets  of  pij  for  player  p,  defining  them  respectively  as  follows: 
p
ij UCS = 
{p Î P: p fpij  for  player  p  ), 
p
ij LCS =  {p Î P: p p  pij  for  player  p).    Again,  all 
propositions  hold  with  weak  forms  of  the  upper  and  lower  contour  sets,  though  the 
exposition is more tedious.  The required modification of the proofs with weak contour 
sets is indicated subsequently.  
 
Payoff Space Partitions  
  The  following  payoff  space  partitions  are  central  to  our  analysis.    We  will 
subsequently provide graphically illustrations of these sets for amicable, adversarial, and 
indifferent players.  Note that all sets are subsets of the primitive joint payoff space.   
    
(1).   Superior Set (S)   
      S = 
B A UCS UCS 11 11 Ç   
 
 (2).   Far Set (F) 
  F = 
B A UCS UCS 22 22 Ç      
 
(3).  Central Set (C) 
  C = 
B A LCS LCS S 22 22 Ç Ç    6
  
(4).  Dominant Set of player p  (D
p) 
 
p p p LCS UCS D
- Ç = 11 22 ,    where – p indicates player “not p.” 
 
(5).  Central Set of player p  (C
p) 
 
p p p p LCS LCS UCS C 22 11 11 Ç Ç =
-  
 
(6).  Far Set of player p (F
p) 
 
p p p p UCS LCS UCS F
- - Ç Ç = 11 22 22   
   
Payoff Partitions When Both Players are Indifferent 
  Since players’ subjective amicable, adversarial, or indifferent attitude towards one 
another are not directly observable the standard assumption is one of indifference – that is, 
each player’s strategy choices are governed by their own cardinal payoffs alone.  Of course, 
it is also possible that such indifference is in fact a player’s true preference towards others. 
Letting  subscripts  denote  partials  the  indifferent  player’s  preferences  are: 
Aa > 0,  Ab = 0,  Bb > 0,  Ba = 0,  and indifference curves are linear in the joint-payoff space.  
Figure 1 below illustrates the payoff-space partition for indifferent players.  These sets have 
different topology for amicable or adversarial players and we will rigorously characterize 
the relationship between them under the various preferences in the following section.     7
    
Payoff Partitions When Both Players are Amicable 
We say player A is amicable at p, if Aa(p) > 0  and  Ab(p) > 0  and a globally 
amicable if the inequalities hold at all p.  A similar definition applies for player B.  An 
extreme  form  of  amicability  is  altruism.    Player  A  is  an  altruist  at  p  if  and  only  if  
¶lnA(p)/¶lnb > ¶lnA(p)/¶lna and a global altruist if the condition holds at all p.  When 
comparing preferences A°(p) and A*(p) we say that A° is more amicable than A* at p  if 
-A°a / A°b > -A*a / A*b.  Given our definitions an amicable player’s indifference curves 
of are downward sloping in the joint payoff-space.  Figure 2 illustrates a payoff-space 












Figure 1-  
The Payoff Partition -- Indifferent Players 
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  The juxtaposition Figure 2 and 1 provides a striking illustration of the distortions 
of the payoff-partitions vis-à-vis the indifferent  player.  We will demonstrate that this 
non-congruence has critical implication for the interpretation and existence of PDs in the 
unobserved utility game.   
 
Payoff Partitions When Both Players are Adversarial 
 We say player A is an adversary (or has enmity) at p if Aa(p) > 0  and  Ab(p) < 0  
and a global adversary if the inequalities hold at all p.  Indifference curves of a player 









The Payoff Partition – Amicable Players 
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A   9
player A has strong enmity for the other player at p  if:  ¶lnA(p)/¶lnb > ¶lnA(p)/¶lna, 
and that preferences A° display less enmity than A* at p  if -A°a / A°b > -A*a / A*b at p. 
Figure  3  below  illustrates  a  payoff-space  partition  for  adversaries,  with  indifferent 
players’ partitions again in the background.  
 
  As in the case of amicable preferences, Figure 3 reveals dramatic “distortions” in 
the payoff-space partitions – though they are markedly different.  Note that for these 
adversaries, as opposed to indifferent and amicable players, the Far Sets (F, F
A, F
B) are 
now bounded.  Also note that the Central Set (C) has remained bounded in all scenarios.  
We now move to consideration of the existence of PD under these various preferences.  
b 
a
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3. Prisoners Dilemmas under Alternative Preferences  
3.1 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Prisoners Dilemmas in the Utility Game 
    We are now in a position to connect the existence of PDs with the payoff-space 
partitions.  We begin by defining two forms of PDs: Strong and Weak. 
 
- Strong Prisoners Dilemma (SPD) 
A game is a SPD if the strategy yielding the Pareto Inferior payoff is a dominant 
strategy for both players.  
- Weak Prisoners Dilemma (WPD) 
A game is a WPD if the strategy yielding the Pareto Inferior payoff is a dominant 
strategy for only one player. 
   
The following Propositions provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the various 
forms of PDs, for multiple equilibrium, and for no equilibrium in our framework.  We note 
that  Propositions  1-5  hold  for  any  types  of  attitudes  between  the  players:  amicable, 
adversarial, and indifferent.   
 
Proposition 1.  Given any p11 and p22 Î S, pij Î 
p D  for i,j = 1, 2  i≠j and p = A, B are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the unique Nash Equilibrium to be a SPD.  
Proof:  Sufficient: First consider player A’s best responses. Given the above conditions: p12 
Î 
A UCS22  and p21 Î 
A LCS11, therefore s
A = 1 is a dominant strategy for A.  An analogous 
argument holds for B.  Necessary:  Again first consider player A.  Suppose the conditions 
Proposition 1 are not satisfied.  If p12 Ï 
A D  then either p12 Ï 
A UCS22 or p12 Ï 
B LCS11.  If 
p12 Ï 
A UCS22, p12 Î 
A LCS22 (recall our strong definitions of UCS and LCS) and r
A(2) = 2 
so that s
A = 1 is no longer a dominant strategy. If p12 Ï 
B LCS11, p12 Î 
B UCS11 so that r
B(1) 
=2 and s
B=1 is no longer a dominant strategy.  A similar argument holds for p21 Ï 
B D \      11
Corollary 1:  A necessary condition for the existence of a SPD is that B11 Ç A22 ≠ f and B22 
Ç A11 ≠ f.   
Proof:  Immediate given Theorem 1. If B11 Ç A22 = f, 
A
V D  is empty.   
 
Proposition 2:  Given any p11 and a p22 Î SV, a sufficient condition for a unique Nash 
Equilibrium which is a WPD is: pij Î
p D and pji Î
p C
-  for i, j = 1, 2 where i≠j .   
Proof:  First consider the case where p12 Î
A D and p21 Î
B C . Then p12 Î 
A UCS22  and p21 Î 
A LCS11, therefore s
A = 1 is a dominant strategy for A.  For player B, p12 Î 
B LCS11 so  r
B(1) 
= 1 and p21 Î 
B LCS22 so  r
B(2) = 2. So B has no dominant strategy and s = {1,1} is the 
unique Nash Equilibrium.  An analogous argument holds for the case of p21 Î
B D  and 
p12 Î
A C , in which case player B is the player with the dominant strategy.   
 
Proposition 3: Given any p11 and a p22 Î SV if pij Î 
p D and pji Î B F  i≠j , i,j = 1, 2, then (j, i) 
is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. 
Proof:  First consider the case where p12 Î
A D  and p21 Î
B F . Then p12 Î 
A UCS22  and p21 Î 
A UCS11, so r
A(2) = 1 and r
A(1) = 2.  For player B, p12 Î 
B LCS11 so  r
B(1) = 1 and p21 Î 
B UCS22 so  r
B(2) = 1. So B has a dominant strategy and s = {2,1} is the unique Nash 
Equilibrium – which is not a PD.  An analogous argument holds for the case of p21 
Î
B D  and p12 Î
A F , in which case player A has the dominant strategy.   
Proposition 4:  Given any p11 and a p22 Î SV if pij Î
p D and pji ÎC i≠j , i,j = 1, 2 then the 
game has no Nash equilibrium.   12
Proof: First consider the case where p12 Î
A D  and p21 Î C. Then p12 Î 
A UCS22  and p21 Î 
A UCS11, so r
A(2) = 1 and r
A(1) = 2.  For player B, p12 Î 
B LCS11 so  r
B(1) = 1 and p21 Î 
B UCS11 so  r
B(2) = 1. So there is no Nash Equilibrium.  An analogous argument holds 
for the case of p21 Î
B D  and p12 ÎC. 
 
  Proposition 5:  Given any p11 and a p22 Î SV, both s= {1, 1}and s’= {2, 2} are equilibrium 
if: p12 Î
A C  and p21 Î
B C .  
Proof:  p12 Î 
A LCS22 so r
A(2) = 2 and p21 Î 
A LCS11 so r
A(1) = 1.  For player B p12 Î 
B LCS11 
so r
B(1) = 1 and p21 Î 
B LCS22 so r
B(1) = 1 and r
B(2) = 2 \    
 
Discussion 
    Propositions 1 through 5 make clear that it is the membership of the pij payoffs in the 
various partitions of the joint-payoff space that determine the nature of the equilibrium, 
or lack thereof.  Of  critical relevance to the  existence of Prisoner’s  Dilemmas is the 
membership of at least one of the pij payoffs in a player’s Dominant Set.  The Figures of 
Section 2 suggest that under amicable or adversarial preferences the Players’ Dominant 
Sets  contract  and  expand  respectively.    An  immediate  implication  is  that  though  the 
observable  payoff  structure  of  a  game  suggests  a  Prisoners  Dilemma  equilibrium, 
unobserved  amicable  or  adversarial  attitudes  of  the  players  may  transform  the  utility 
game to one with a different equilibrium.  The mechanism of this transformation is the 
“migration”  of  pij  payoffs  between  Payoff-space  Partitions  as  we  move  from  the 
primitive game, with the implied indifference of players, to a utility game with amicable 
or adversarial preferences. Only in the case of truly indifferent player can we be certain 
that the Dominant Sets in the observable game and utility games are congruent.    13
3.2 Payoff-Space Partition Congruence with non-Indifferent Players 
    The Figures of Section 2 were merely suggestive of the types of Payoff-space Set 
transformation  that  may  occur  when  non-indifferent  players  are  present.    We  now 
formally  characterize  these  transformations.    Note  that  in  the  prior  and  proceeding 
analysis,  multiple-crossing  of  an  indifference  curve  of  an  amicable  player  with  a 
particular indifference curve of another amicable player would complicate the analysis.  
To keep the paper of manageable length we focus on single crossing indifference curves 
of amicable players and note that the results would be modified in fairly obvious ways in 
the presence of multiple crossing curves.  To facilitate presentation of the next results we 
introduce the following additional notation:  for each set of the payoff-space partition let 
the subscripts G or V indicate respectively the primitive or utility game partition.  For 
example, 
p DG  is player p’s Dominant Set in observable payoffs while 
p
V D is player p’s 
Dominant Set in the utility game. 
   
Both Players are Adversaries 
Proposition 6.  With adversarial preferences a player’s Primitive Dominant Set is a strict 
sub-set of their Utility Dominant Set:  
p DG  Ì 
p
V D . 
Proof.  Consider the point  p’ = (a22, b11). With adversarial preferences p’ Î 
A UCS22 and 
p’ Î 
B LCS11, so p’ Î
A
V D .  With regard to the primitive game p’Ï 
A DG , since p’ Î A22 
and p’ Î B11. A similar argument holds for player B. To see that every element of 
i DG 
must be an element of 
i
V D simply note that because of the finite upward slope of 
indifference  curves  with adversarial preferences"p Î 
A DG ,  p  Î 
A UCS22 and  p  Î 
B LCS11\     14
Note that even if the upper and lower contour sets were defined weakly we could find 
a point in an open ball centered on p’ that is an element of 
i
V D  but not 
i DG.  This general 
argument holds for all subsequent propositions, and will not be repeated.   
 
Proposition 7.  If both players have adversarial preferences the Utility Central Set is a 
strict sub-set of the Primitive Central Set:  CV Ì CG  
Proof: CG is the quadrilateral defined by {p |  p11 < p < p22}.  Given that B11 and A22 have 
finite positive slopes and pass through p11 and p22 respectively, they must intersect in the 
interior of CG since B11 cannot intersect B22 which also passes through p22.  .  Likewise 
for A11 and B22.  Therefore CV Ì CG \ 
 
Proposition 8.  With adversarial preferences the Superior Set of the utility game is a strict 
sub-set of the primitive Superior Set:  SV Ì SG.   
Proof. SG is the quadrant defined by p > p11.  Since adversarial indifference curves have 
finite  positive  upward  slope  A11  and  B11  are  contained  in  SG  for  all  p > p11.  The 
intersection of the upper contour sets for p > p11 must therefore be empty or contained 
in SG.  So every element of SV must also be an element of SG.   To see that not every 
element of SG  is an element of SV let  ) ' (p
c
e B  be a closed ball of radius e centered on 
p’ Î A11 for some p' > p11, where we choose e such that  ) ' (p
c
e B  Ì SG. By the Jordan 
Curve Theorem the indifference curve through p’ divides the ball into two distinct 
domains, one a subset of 
A UCS11 and the other a subset of 
A LCS11 where by definition 
if p’’ Î  ) ' (p
c
e B   and p’’ Î 
A LCS11, p’’Ï SV\   
   15
We can make the following stronger characterization of SV when both players are both 
strong adversaries. 
 
Proposition 9. SV is either empty or bounded if players are strong global adversaries. 
Proof: With a  on the ordinate and b  the abscissa, as in Figure 3, A’s and B’s indifference 
curves are respectively convex and concave with positive finite slope.   
(i).  If  the  indifference  curves  are  tangent  at  p11  the  intersection  of  the  upper 
contour sets is empty. 
 (ii). If the slope of A11 exceeds that of B11 at p11 the intersection of the upper 
contour  sets  must  lie  to  the  southwest  of  p11  and  is  contained  in  the 
bounded set: {p : a < a11,  b < b11 }.  
(iii.) If the slope of B11 exceeds that of A11 at p11 the indifference curves must 
intersect again (since B11 is strictly concave and A11 strictly convex).  Call 
this intersection p’.  In this case the contour sets intersection must lie to 
the southwest of p’: in the bounded set {p : a < a’ and  b < b’}\  
Corollary to Proposition 9.  If players are strong adversaries F
V is either empty or bounded. 
Proof:  Simply repeat the above proof substituting p22 for p11, A22 for A11, and B22 for B11.   
 
The following very strong proposition is the principal non-existence results of our analysis. 
 
Proposition 10. If players are strong adversaries at p11 a game which is PD in observable 
payoffs can never be a PD in the utility game. 
Proof: Suppose in contradiction to Proposition 10 a game which is a PD in cardinal payoffs 
is also a PD in the utility game. Then p22 Î SV, and A(p22) > A(p11) and B(p11) 
<B(p22). As both preference functions are continuously differentiable, there exists an 
open ball Be(p11), and a p’ = (a11+da, b11+db) Î Be(p11),  with da, db > 0, such that 
Aa(p11) da + Ab(p11) db > 0   and   Ba(p11) da + Bb(p11) db > 0.  Taking into account   16
the signs of the partial derivatives these inequalities yield: Aa(p11) / Ab(p11) < Ba(p11) 
/ Bb(p11). By the definition of strong adversaries at p11, however, Aa(p11) / Ab(p11) > 
Ba(p11) / Bb(p11), a contradiction\ 
 
Proposition 10 extends an important implication of Proposition 9. That is, when players 
are global strong adversaries a primitive Prisoner’s Dilemma can never be a UPD.  It also 
provides  a  dramatic  example  of  a  more  general  result  which  holds  for  all  forms  of 
adversarial preferences.  Namely, adversarial behaviour reduces from an infinite to a finite 
(Lebesgue) measure the set of primitive payoffs that could possibly be associated with a 
utility prisoner’s dilemma.  Moreover, in the strong adversary case of Proposition 10 the 
bounded set F
V will never include p22.  Since all prisoners dilemmas (primitive or utility) 
require  a  Pareto  dominant  payoff,  the  non-existence  of  the  utility  prisoners  dilemma 
follows.    This  non-congruence  of  the  observable  primitive  game  and  the  inherently 
unobservable utility game has profound implications for the interpretation of a wide range 
of economic applications – including the public goods problem.   
Both Players are Amicable 
Proposition 11.  If both players are amicable the Dominant Sets of the utility game (if 
they exist) are strict sub-sets of their primitive game Dominant Sets:
i
V D Ì
i DG.   
Proof. Since both A22 and B11 have negative finite slope their intersection must occur in 
A DG , if at all.  Thus every element of 
A
V D  is also an element of 
A DG .  By Corollary 1 
A22 and B11 must intersect for 
A
V D  to be non-empty.  If it occurs call the intersection 
point p’ Î 
A DG .  Now consider an e>0 such that the closed ball ) ' (p
c
e B Ì
A DG , and A11   17
partitions  ) ' (p
c
e B  into distinct domains one of which contains elements of 
A LCS22, 
which are not members of 
A
V D  but are elements of 
A DG \ 
 
Proposition 12.  If both players have amicable preferences the Primitive Central Set is a 
strict sub-set of the Utility Central Set:  CGÌ CV. 
Proof: CG is the quadrilateral defined by {p |  p11 < p < p22}.  Given that B11 and A22 have 
finite negative slopes and pass through p11 and p22 respectively, they must intersect in the 
interior of DG, if at all.  Likewise for A11 and B22.  Therefore CG Ì CV \ 
 
Proposition 13.  With amicable preferences the Superior Set of the primitive game is a 
strict sub-set of the Superior Set of the utility game:  SGÌ SV.   
Proof. Immediate.  With amicable preferences the indifference curves A11 and Bll are 
support functions for SG\ 
Figure 4 below provides a summary of the principal results of this sub-section.   
 
 
Figure 4  
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Note  that  the  likelihood  of  a  PPD  having  an  associated  UPD  is  reduced  in 
different  ways  for  adversaries  and  amicable  players.    In  the  case  of  adversaries  the 
likelihood that the Pareto Superior payoff in the primitive game is also Pareto Superior in 
the utility game is reduced. For amicable players the likelihood that the “off diagonal” 
payoff provides defection incentive from the Pareto Superior payoff is reduced.  
  
Asymmetric Attitudes and the Central Set as a Measure of Amicability 
Asymmetric attitudes across players generate a rich set of possibilities.  In this 
sub-section we briefly explore congruence properties of the Central Set when players 
have asymmetric attitudes.  We focus on the Central Set since its boundedness properties 
and sensitivity to alternative preferences render it a good measure of general amicability. 
Proposition 14. Suppose player B is neutral. If player A is amicable CGÌ CV while if 
player A is an adversary: CV Ì CG. 
Proof. Immediate given slight adaptations of Propositions 7 and 12. 
  As attitudes move from indifference to amicability, the defection incentive that 
gives rise to the PPD is attenuated and the potential for no-equilibrium increases. By 
Propositions 7 and 12 the Central Set expansion comes at the expense of the Dominant 
Sets.  The following result, which combines amicable and adversarial players, is also 
immediate: 
 
Proposition 15. Suppose player A is amicable and B adversarial. Ceteris paribus, 
i).  the larger the ratio -Ba / Bb on the interval  [a11, a22 ], the smaller CV. 
ii). the smaller the ratio -Aa / Ab on the interval  [a11, a22 ], the smaller CV. 
 
Proof. Again immediate given slight modifications to Propositions 7 and 12.    19
  Together Propositions 7, 12, 14, and 15 suggest that the area of the Central Set is 
an intriguing metric of the aggregate “friendliness” of the players. Recall that the Central 
Set is always bounded when both players are indifferent or adversarial.  As preferences 
move from adversarial to indifference to amicability the area of Central Set increases 
monotonically.    When  at  least  one  player  is  amicable,  the  Central  Set  is  no  longer 
necessarily  bounded,  though  it  remains  bounded  under  many  well  behaved  utility 
functions and its area increases uniformly with increasing amicability as defined earlier.  
The Cobb-Douglas example of the following section will further illustrate this property.   
 
3.3.  A Cobb-Douglas Example 
We  begin  with  amicable  preferences  and  to  simplify  exposition  express  B’s 
preferences in terms of primitive payoffs “a” for player A and “b” for own primitive 
payoff.  The utility functions are then: 
 
(7)    A (a, b) =  a
x b
1-x  
B (a, b) =  a
1-y b
y,                                                       
 
where x and y are non-negative. Note that if x Î (0,1), Player A is amicable, and is an 
altruist if x Î (0,1/2). 
  By Corollary 1, A22 and B11 must intersect for D
A to exist and membership of a 
p12 in D
A is a necessary condition for the existence of a SPD.  Let  11 B  and  22 A be the 
utility levels associated with indifference curves B11 and A22.  For an arbitrary a = a, b 
¹ b in these indifference sets except for a point of intersection.  Considering an arbitrary 
a=a, substituting a for “a” in (7), defining  º =a b
a
b
|  R(a; x, y), and rearranging (7) 
yields:    20






                                        
        
Proposition 16. The Dominant Sets are non-empty if either: i). both players are amicable 
but not altruists; ii). one is an altruist and one merely amicable, with x+y > 1.  
Proof: For either i) or ii) above at a = a11, b > b so R(a11; x, y) >1.  Moreover if either i) 
or ii) are satisfied x + y >1 and lim a­¥ R(a; x, y) = 0 so the indifference curves cross at 
some a, with the intersection obtained by solving R(a; x, y) = 1  \ 
 
Proposition 17.   The Dominant Sets are empty if either: i). both players are altruists; ii).  
one is an altruist and the other merely amicable, with x+y < 1; iii). players are amicable 
with x+y = 1. 
Proof: Reasoning similar to the Proof of  (16) implies for i) and ii) the curves never 
intercept at a > a11.  If x+y = 1, the b is independent of a, and lim a­¥ R(a; x, y) = lim 




11 , a constant. Thus the curves are either parallel or coincide, but 
never cross. 
 
These Propositions indicate that when both players are amicable and at least one 
is  sufficiently  altruistic,  a  utility  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  will  never  occur.    With  these 
explicit utility functions we can also compute the “gains and losses” in the Dominant Set 
from different attitudes. For example, for simplicity letting x=y we can derive a lower 
bound for the reduction in the dominant sets when both players are amicable. Using (8) 
the intersection occurs at: a* = ( 22 A ) 
x / 1-2x ( 11 B )
 1-x / 1-2x.  Recalling that A22 and B22 pass 
through p22 one can also write: 
   21
(9)    a22 = ( 22 A  ) 
x / 1-2x ( 22 B )
 1-x / 1-2x,   so that 
a* / a22 = ( 11 B  /  22 B )
 1-x / 1-2x  > 1     . 
 
Therefore player A’s utility dominant set relative to primitive dominant set, is reduced by 
at least the area: b11 . a22 [ ( 22 B / 11 B )
 1-x / 2x-1 – 1] . To this it must be added the area 
beyond point a* and below the indifference curve A22. Computing this integral yields: 
 
(10)  ( 22 A )
1 / 1-x (1-x  / 2x-1) a*
 1-2x / 1-x =   (1-x  / 2x-1)(  22 A )
1 / 1-x( 11 B / 22 B )
 a22
1-2x / 1-x    . 
 
                  
In  spite  of  curve  B11  going  to  zero,  Player’s  A  utility  dominant  set  (which  remains 
unbounded) does not have finite measure. A more precise bound may be obtained by 
computing the area outside the UDS between B11 and the vertical line passing through p11 
until an a’>a*. We shall not pursue this computation here.  The above results suggest the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 18. If x=y and 2x > 1, the lower bound to the reduction in Player’s A utility 
dominant set is increasing with the ratio rB = B22 / B11  whenever  rB > ( 22 A )
1 / 1-x (1 /b11) 
(a22)
 1-x / 1-2x  and decreasing if the reverse occurs. 
 
Proof. The increasing result is immediate. For the decreasing it suffices to compute the 
derivative, w.r.t. rB, of the combined area.     
 
The main importance of Proposition 18 is to emphasize that it is the normalized 
utility values at points p11 and p22 that are crucial in determining the distortions in the 
relevant PD sets.   22
   
Adversarial Preferences 
For adversaries additional flexibility is obtained if we re-specify the Cobb-Douglas utility 
functions as follows: 
(11)    A (a, b) = a
x b
-y  
B (a, b) = a
w b
z ,                                                        
with all exponents non-negative and x and z less than 1. Note that if y>x  and  w>z both 
players have  strong  global enmity.  In  this  case  all  indifference  curves  emanate  from 
origin  and  have  a  single-crossing  property.  If  x>y  and  w<z,  the  concavities  of 
indifference curves are reversed, though all indifference curves still emanate from the 
origin.  Finally, if x>y and w>z, or x<y and w<z, multiple crossing of indifference curves 
are possible and a set of complex possibilities arise. 
  Now return to the strong global enmity case (y>x  and  w>z).   Proposition 9 
states that FV is either empty or bounded. It follows that the area of F can be obtained. 
 
Proposition  18.  With  strong  global  enmity  the  area  of  FV  shrinks  from  an  infinite 
(Lebesgue-measure) value to a22 . b22 [ (wy – zx)/(w+z)(x+y) ]  . 
Proof : The A22 and B22 curves intercept at (0, 0) and (a22, b22). With a on the ordinate 
A22 is “below” B22 on the interval (0;a22) and we have the function: F(a) = ( 22 A )
-1/y a
x/y - 
( 22 B )
1/z a
w/z .   Integrating this function on the interval and recalling that: ( 22 A )
-1/y a22
x/y 
= b22 = ( 22 B )
1/z a22
w/z, one arrives at the result. Notice that the relationship between the 
exponents ensures that  wy – zx > 0 .                                                                                      
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4. Summary and Conclusion  
  Prisoner’s  dilemmas  provide  a  fundamental  paradigm  of  the  tension  between 
individual  and  collective  rationality.    Analysis  of  their  structure  and  operation  has 
provided insight into issues ranging from the public goods problem to arms races.  Yet 
the predictive power of the paradigm depends critically on implicit assumptions on the 
nature of the mapping from observable primitive payoff to unobservable final utility.  
When unobservable final utility depends only on own-primitive-payoff the equilibrium 
of a primitive-payoff-game and the associated utility-games are identical.  Under this 
circumstance the specific properties of the unobservable utility function are immaterial 
for predictions of strategy choice and a primitive game with a PD equilibrium is a perfect 
proxy for the unobservable final utility game.  However, when linkages exist between the 
primitive  payoff  of  one  player  and  the  utility  of  another,  PD  equilibrium  in  the 
observable game may not correspond to equilibrium in the utility game.  Moreover, as 
discussed previously, a large body of experimental evidence is generally inconsistent 
with pure indifference of players to the payoffs of others. 
  This paper explores the implications of two types of linkages between the players’ 
final utility and the other player’s primitive payoff: adversarial and amicable preferences.  
We  demonstrate  that  such  non-indifference  generates  specific  non-congruencies  of  the 
“primitive-dominant-set”  and  “utility-dominant-sets,”  which  has  the  consequence  of 
mapping apparent PD’s into other (non-PD) equilibrium.  On the other hand, utility PDs 
may arise in games that do not exhibit PD structure in primitive payoffs.  
 
To appreciate the implications of this non-congruence consider a standard two-
person  PD  in  observable  payoffs.      Both  players  are  apparently  better  off  through   24
cooperation than competition, though the temptation of defection precludes cooperation 
as a non-cooperative equilibrium. It would therefore seem that players have incentive to 
create institutions that can support the Pareto-superior payoffs. Indeed, we observe many 
situations where institutions supporting the Pareto Superior outcome are created and the 
gains  from  cooperation  can  be  realized.    However,  we  also  observe  many  situations 
where such institutions do not emerge and where all players appear to reap inefficiently 
low returns.  This paper proposes a new explanation for such phenomenon.  Namely, that 
the joint-strategy Pareto superior utility-payoffs do not in fact exist.  The Kyoto Protocol, 
and the “2003 WTO Cancun Meeting”, could be examples of this phenomenon. On the 
flip side, equilibrium that appears Pareto optimal in primitive payoffs may in fact be PDs 
in utility payoffs.  Ongoing research applies this theory to the successes and failures of a 
variety of trade and political institutions.  
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